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Renormalization and the Formulation
of Scientiﬁc Realism
James D. Fraser*y
Providing a precise statement of their position has long been a central challenge facing
scientiﬁc realists. This article draws some morals about how realism ought to be formu-
lated from the renormalization group framework in high-energy physics.
1. Introduction. Many philosophers of science subscribe to scientiﬁc real-
ism. Unfortunately, there is much less agreement about what this doctrine
amounts to. My suggestion in this article is that the renormalization group
framework in high-energy physics provides an instructive case study when
it comes to the question of how realism ought to be formulated. The claim
that the renormalization group has important implications for a realist view
of quantum ﬁeld theory (QFT) has beenmooted in the past byDavidWallace
(2006, 2011) and more recently by Porter Williams (2017). I develop this
line of thought in a broader context here and argue that there are lessons to
be learned for the broader realism debate. On the one hand, the role the re-
normalization group plays in identifying aspects of QFT models we should
take representationally seriously supports a local approach to articulating the
realist thesis; rather than attempting to explicate how theories latch onto the
world in general terms, it shows that resources found in particular scientiﬁc
contexts can be a crucial part of this story. On the other hand, it points to a
strategy for responding to Kyle Stanford’s “trust argument.” Stanford chal-
*To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Durham University,
50 Old Elvet, DH1 3HN, United Kingdom; e-mail: jamesf09@hotmail.co.uk.
yThanks to Doreen Fraser and Laura Ruetsche for inviting me to participate in the sym-
posium and to Steven French, Porter Williams, and Laura Ruetsche (again) for useful
discussions of previous versions of this material.
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lenges the realist to tell us what of our current theories will survive future sci-
entiﬁc progress. While this can seem to be an impossible task in the abstract,
I will suggest that it may become more tractable at the local, theory-by-
theory, level.
The plan for the article is as follows: section 2 provides an opinionated
overview of some key issues surrounding the formulation of realism, sec-
tion 3 introduces the renormalization group and explains how it helps sub-
stantiate a realist analysis of QFT models, and section 4 draws out some
broader morals for the formulation problem.
2. The Formulation Problem. What is scientiﬁc realism? A naive answer
is that it is the claim that our best-conﬁrmed scientiﬁc theories are true. It
quickly becomes obvious that construing realism in this way renders it a
wildly implausible doctrine, however. One much-discussed reason is the
pattern of theory change found in the historical record. Examples of theories
that made accurate predictions in their day but later turned out to be false are
legion in the history of science, and while philosophers with realist sympa-
thies have pushed against the idea that this undermines the connection be-
tween empirical success and truth entirely, they typically admit that it gives
us grounds to doubt that current theories get everything exactly right. There
are also ample indications within contemporary science itself that our theo-
ries are not entirely veridical. To take a particularly stark example, our most
fundamental physical theories, QFT and general relativity, furnish mutually
inconsistent accounts of what the world is like, and powerful theoretical
arguments suggest that a completely new framework is needed to fully de-
scribe gravitational phenomena.
What should the would-be realist replace this naive formulation with?
What seems to be needed is a more modest epistemic attitude toward predic-
tively successful theories: something stronger than merely taking them to be
empirically adequate, as the constructive empiricist advises, but weaker than
believing everything they say about the world. A common move when out-
lining the realist position in its broad brushstrokes is to replace the word
‘true’ in the naive formulation with ‘approximately true’. Ultimately, though,
this only postpones the problem, as what it means for a theory to be approx-
imately true stands in dire need of clariﬁcation. While there is a great deal of
disagreement over how a more precise formulation of realism should be de-
veloped in detail, some consensus has emerged about the general form it
should take. It is widely agreed, among both contemporary realists and anti-
realist critics, that any formulation worthy of serious consideration must be
‘selective’, recommending we commit ourselves to some parts of a successful
theory’s content, while rejecting, or remaining agnostic about, others. The
challenge to spell out the sense in which successful theories are approximately
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true can then be answered, at least in part, by pointing to a subset of their claims
about the unobservable that hit their mark.1 This selective approach owes its
popularity to the dominant realist approach to the challenge of historical theory
change. In response to pessimistic inductionists, realist commentators have
urged that the empirical success of superseded theories did not depend on their
claims that conﬂict with present science. Rather, the theoretical constituents of
these theories that were really responsible for their accurate predictions are re-
tained in their successors and therefore have a shot at describing the world as it
is. The lesson that has been drawn from the debate over theory change then is
that the realist’s epistemic optimism ought to be directed at the parts of a theory
that underwrite, and explain, its predictive successes rather than its representa-
tional content as a whole.
This idea is sufﬁciently vague that it can be ﬂeshed out and interpreted in
very different ways, leading to a proliferation of selective formulations of
realism in the recent literature. There are many points of divergence between
these variants, but I will focus here on two key questions on which the re-
normalization group sheds interesting light: whether selectivists should spell
out their commitments in global or local terms and whether it is possible to
implement the selective strategy prospectively, in advance of future scientiﬁc
developments.2
Once a broadly selective approach to the formulation problem has been
adopted, the obvious question is which parts of our theories should we be
committed to. There are different particular answers to this question, but there
are also different types of answers. A more global answer (in my terminol-
ogy) aims to provide a general characterization of the belief-worthy content
of any successful theory. Saatsi (2017) calls this sort of approach ‘recipe re-
alism’: the ideal being a formula that takes in theories and spits out beliefs
about the world in a completely regular way. One brand of realism that has
1. To be sure, many questions remain about approximate truth and its role in the formu-
lation of realism. Some selective realists ascribe the property of approximate truth to in-
dividual theory constituents, for instance, so there is a residual puzzle about how to
make sense of this notion at this level of particular theoretical claims.
2. The global/local axis I am invoking here should not be confused with the question of
whether arguments for realism ought to be construed globally or locally. The no-miracles
argument has traditionally been understood as a meta-scientiﬁc inference starting from
the success of science as a whole; but this approach has recently come under attack, with
some advocating a shift toward more local arguments found within science itself as the
core motivation for realism (Magnus and Callender 2004; Saatsi 2009). What I am in-
terested in here, however, is how the realist thesis should be stated; in principle at least,
this is a separate issue from how it is defended. One might favor global arguments for
realism while cashing out the speciﬁc commitments engendered by one’s epistemology
of science on a theory-by-theory basis, for instance.
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sometimes been understood in these terms is epistemic structural realism.3
Following Worrall (1989), contemporary incarnations of this doctrine have
been inspired by episodes of theory change in physics in which posited en-
tities, such as the luminiferous ether and gravitational ﬁeld, are dropped,
but continuities exist at the level of mathematical structure. The conclusion
drawn is that it is the structural claims of our theories that realists ought to
put their faith in. One attempt at making this precise has been to identify
the structural content of a theory with its Ramsey sentence, apparently fur-
nishing a procedure for picking out the claims structuralists ought to commit
themselves to that can be applied across the board. Many contemporary
brands of realism at least aspire to this sort of blanket statement about which
aspects of our theories get things right.
No formulation of this kind has achieved anything close to widespread
acceptance, however. One problem is that the diversity of science makes
generalization a risky business. Recipes for identifying veridical content that
are compelling in one area of science may be much less so in others. Stan-
ford (2003) attacks structural realism, for instance, by pointing to examples
from biology in which mathematical structure does not seem to be preserved
through theory change. Another worry is that the drive toward generality
leads global formulations to abstract away from peculiarities of particular
theories that are relevant to appraising their representational success. While
both Newtonian gravity theory and thermodynamics can arguably be de-
scribed as sharing structure with more fundamental physical theories, the
speciﬁc structural claims that are retained at the fundamental level are quite
different in each case, as is the sort of explanation this affords of the theory’s
empirical successes. Even in contexts in which the structuralist intuition has
some purchase then, the distinction between structural and nonstructural
claims seems to be too coarse-grained to pinpoint the parts of a theory that
drive its success. Ultimately, global formulations tend to ﬁnd themselves in
the uncomfortable position of being simultaneously too general and not gen-
eral enough to convincingly carry out the selective project.
These sorts of concerns have led some philosophers to move toward a
more local response to the formulation problem (Barrett 2008; Saatsi 2016,
2017). Instead of trying to specify how successful theories relate to the world
in one fell swoop, this approach implements the selective strategy on a theory-
3. I should note here that while structural realism is often read as a global selective for-
mulation of realism, it is not clear that its advocates understand it this way. French and
Ladyman (2010, 32), for instance, state that “the job of predicting what will be preserved
and what abandoned by future science belongs to science itself not to philosophy,” ap-
parently disavowing the idea that the notion of structure delineates which parts of suc-
cessful theories we should trust in Stanford’s (2006) sense. Still, this caricature of struc-
tural realism will be a useful foil for the localized approach to the formulation problem I
will introduce shortly.
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by-theory basis. The question of what sort of doxastic attitude we ought to
take toward the theoretical claims of Newtonian gravity, for instance, is an-
swered via a close study of the theory itself rather than invoking some gen-
eral criterion for realist commitment. Barrett (2008) points, in particular, to
foundational research on geometrized formulations of Newtonian gravity
(surveyed in Malament [2012]), which allows us to precisely describe how
some of its extra-empirical content is embedded within general relativity, as
doing the real work in spelling out the sense in which the theory is approxi-
mately true. This is a thoroughly theory-speciﬁc story, and the thought is that
carrying out the selective strategy in practice will typically turn on local sci-
entiﬁc arguments and theoretical resources. Local realists still adopt a general
epistemic stance toward science: they take the empirical success of our theo-
ries to be explained, at least for the most part, by the fact that they are getting
something right about the world. But the task of spelling out the speciﬁc
claims about the world engendered by this stance is delegated to philosophers
of the speciﬁc sciences.
While this move avoids some of the difﬁculties plaguing global formula-
tions, however, it seems to have a serious cost when it comes to the issue of
prospective applicability. Local selectivists might be able to point to inter-
theoretic relations with general relativity to clarify the representational status
of Newtonian gravity, but what about general relativity itself? Global selec-
tive realists will have an answer here: they will wheel out their formula for
identifying belief-worthy content. But what can the localist, who eschews this
kind of response, say? The cases that Barrett and Saatsi point to as exemplars
for the way in which the approximate truth of theories can be cashed out lo-
cally invariably turn on their embedding within more fundamental theories.
Consequently, realism about our current best theories might seem to end up
amounting to little more than a promissory note: the local selective realist
claims that general relativity latches onto reality in a way that explains its suc-
cess, but exactly how we cannot yet say.4 Just as Newton had no idea which
parts of his theory of gravity would be preserved in contemporary gravita-
tional physics, we seem to be in a similar epistemic situation with respect
to current fundamental physics.
This sort of worry is the basis of Stanford’s (2006) “trust argument.” Ac-
cording to Stanford, any form of realism worthy of the name must tell us
4. This obviously threatens our ability to use general relativity to identify belief-worthy
parts of Newtonian gravity, so this problem is apt to ﬂow upward, affecting nonfunda-
mental theories as well. Barrett and Saatsi are, of course, keenly aware of this point
and offer different responses. Barrett (2008) emphasizes that the transition from Newto-
nian gravity to general relativity can still be understood as eliminating descriptive error,
while Saatsi (2016) styles it as an exemplar that can give us a handle on how a theory’s
representational success could possibly explain its empirical success.
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which features of our theories we can trust now, not merely in retrospect. I
suspect that the perceived need to respond to this challenge is a key reason
why defenders of realism have sought to defend a global formulation of their
doctrine that can be projected into the future. An alternative reaction to this
line of attack, however, is to simply refuse the bait and deny that realists need
to state their epistemic commitments prospectively. After all, the claim about
general relativity sketched above clearly goes beyond constructive empiri-
cists’ stance toward the theory; they would, of course, remain completely
agnostic about general relativity’s claims about the unobservable and deny
the need for an explanation of its empirical success in terms of its extra-
empirical representational success. Saatsi (2016) simply bites the bullet here
and calls his local version of realism ‘minimal realism’ in recognition of the
fact that some intuitions about what a realist attitude toward current scientiﬁc
theories amounts to are not necessarily borne out on this formulation.
It is at this juncture in the dialectic that the renormalization group be-
comes interesting. The application of renormalization group methods in high-
energy physics provides another example of how local theoretical resources
can play an important role in substantiating a selective realist reading of a
theory. Crucially, though, this story is prospective in character, operating in
advance of developments beyond the standard model of particle physics.
What this suggests is that abandoning a global formulation of realism does
not necessarily mean ceding the possibility of prospective commitments en-
tirely, and a localized realism need not be as minimal as Saatsi suggests.
3. The Renormalization Group and Selective Realism. The renormal-
ization group is a widely applicable framework for investigating the behav-
ior of systems at different length and energy scales. The basic strategy is to
study the action of a coarse-graining transformation—an operation that takes
us from an initial model to a new one that lacks some of the degrees of free-
dom associated with variations at small-length scales/high energies but shares
its large-scale/low-energy properties. How this procedure is implemented de-
pends a great deal on the sort of systems one is interested in, and consequently,
renormalization group methods take on diverse forms in different areas of
physics (and beyond). I will focus here on the application of renormalization
group methods to QFTand speciﬁcally on the momentum space approach pi-
oneered by Wilson and Kogut (1974).
This story starts with the path integral expression for the partition func-
tion, Z. This crucial quantity encapsulates basically everything there is to
know about a QFTmodel. In particular, all of a theory’s correlation functions
(vacuum expectation values of ﬁeld operators at disparate space-time points)
can be derived from it. For a single scalar ﬁeld f, the partition function is
associated with a functional integral:
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Z 5
ð
DfeiS f½ , (1)
where S[f] is the action of the model, and the measure Df indicates that a
sum is being taken over all possible conﬁgurations of the ﬁeld. As is well
known, there are grave difﬁculties with precisely deﬁning this integral for
a ﬁeld that varies over a continuous space-time. One way around this prob-
lem is to introduce an ultraviolet cutoff L—an upper limit on the possible
momenta of ﬁeld states. A straightforward way of doing this is to place
the theory on a lattice so there is a minimal distance over which the ﬁeld
can vary. Once this is done it is possible to give a precise meaning to the path
integral. The Wilsonian renormalization group is then based on setting up a
coarse-graining transformation on cutoff QFT models of this kind.
Wilson’s insight was that, instead of evaluating the whole path integral at
once, we can start with the contribution due to high-momentum ﬁeld conﬁg-
urations, whose Fourier transforms have support above some value m. This
part of the path integral can be computed separately and absorbed into a shift
in the action. In symbols,
ð
pj j≤m
Df
ð
m≤ pj j≤L
DfeiS 5
ð
pj j≤m
Dfei S1dSð Þ: (2)
This deﬁnes a transformation that takes us from an initial cutoff QFT model
to a new one, which has a lower cutoff, and a modiﬁed dynamics, but be-
haves like the original (speciﬁcally, sharing its long-range correlation func-
tions). This is often informally described as ‘integrating out’ the ﬁeld modes
associated with variations on small-length scales.
We can view this transformation as inducing a ‘ﬂow’ on a space of mod-
els, with dimensions corresponding to all possible interactions between
ﬁelds. Studying this ﬂow has proved to be a powerful source of information
about the scaling properties of QFT models. The most important discovery
for our purposes is the phenomenon of universality in the low-energy re-
gime. It turns out that QFT models with wildly different dynamics display
very similar low-energy behavior. Consider, for the sake of concreteness,
the class of scalar ﬁeld theories with actions of the form
S 5
ð
d4x
1
2
(∂mf)2 2
1
2
m2f2 2o
∞
n52
l2n
2n !
f2n
 
, (3)
where m is a mass parameter and {l4, l6, ...} are couplings for possible in-
teraction terms. Under repeated applications of the coarse-graining transfor-
mation, the renormalization group ﬂow of this class of theories can be shown
to be attracted toward a two-dimensional surface spanned by m and l4 (as
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shown in ﬁg. 1).5 This behavior is believed to hold generally: while inﬁnitely
many interaction terms between a set of ﬁelds are possible, the renormal-
ization group transformation induces a ﬂow toward a ﬁnite-dimensional sur-
face spanned by so-called renormalizable parameters—those with non-
negative mass dimension. This means, in essence, that large classes of QFT
models look the same at suitably large-length scales.
What does all this have to do with scientiﬁc realism? The thought is that
these renormalization group results give us the means to develop a selective
realist reading of current QFTs.
On the one hand, the renormalization group helps us identify features of
QFT models that we should not take representationally seriously.6 Quantum
Figure 1. Renormalization group ﬂow of scalar ﬁeld theories to a surface spanned
by renormalizable parameters.
5. See Polchinski (1984). Duncan (2012) provides a broader discussion of these results
and their signiﬁcance.
6. Williams (2017) gives a similar characterization of the role that the renormalization
group can play in identifying representational artifacts and discusses some more detailed
RENORMALIZATION AND FORMULATION 1171
This content downloaded from 129.234.039.154 on March 08, 2019 07:20:05 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
electrodynamics (QED) and the other component theories of the standard
model of particle physics have famously produced some of themost accurate
predictions in the history of science. Much of this success takes the form of
estimates of cross sections for scattering events produced in particle collid-
ers, with the current threshold on experimentally attainable energies being at
the order of 1013 eV. The renormalization group results just discussed reveal
that many features of current QFT models do not really make a difference to
these empirical successes, however, in the sense that they can be varied with-
out affecting scattering cross sections at these energy scales. For one thing, it
establishes that these quantities are highly insensitive to the imposition of an
ultraviolet cutoff, as well as the details of how this is done. We can also vary
the dynamics of a model at the cutoff scale without affecting its predictions;
adding nonrenormalizable interactions to the QED action, for instance, does
not undermine its empirical adequacy. What this tells us is that many of the
claims QFT models make about the world at the fundamental level do not
contribute to, and are not supported by, the empirical success of the standard
model. Of course, we also have external reasons to doubt that QFTs describe
reality at all scales: the QFT framework itself is expected to break down as
the Planck scale is approached. But the renormalization group gives us a pre-
cise way of pinpointing the parts of current theories that we should disavow,
or at least remain agnostic about.
On the other hand, it seems to provide us with the means to articulate pos-
itive commitments supported by the success of the standard model. The
classes of QFT models that share the same low-energy predictions arguably
make common claims about relatively large-scale, nonfundamental, aspects
of the world. Giving a precise characterization of this shared content is one of
the central challenges facing the sort of realist view of QFT I am proposing
here, but a preliminary strategy is to point to correlation functions over dis-
tances much longer than the cutoff scale as appropriate targets for realist
commitment. These quantities are preserved by the renormalization group
coarse-graining transformation and encode the long-distance structure of a
QFT model. They are also directly connected to its successful predictions:
you cannot vary the long-distance correlation functions of a theory without
drastically affecting its low-energy scattering cross sections.7 Furthermore,
7. A potential objection here is that the realist reading of QFT models I have sketched
fails to adequately distinguish itself from constructive empiricism. This is a prima facie
worry because correlation functions are often characterized in operationalist terms via
their connection to scattering cross sections in the physics literature. A key challenge
facing this approach to QFT then is to give a robustly ontological interpretation of the cor-
relation functions or adopt some other characterization of the coarse-grained theoretical
claims underlying the success of current models.
examples of distortions induced by the imposition of a cutoff, such as Lorentz violations
and mirror fermions that appear when fermionic ﬁelds are put on a lattice.
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in demonstrating that these large-scale properties of a QFT model are insen-
sitive to what is going on at very high energies, the renormalization group is
also telling us that these features are largely independent of the details of un-
known physics at currently inaccessible energy scales. We thus have reason
to be conﬁdent that these features of current QFTs will be retained through
future theory change, in one way or another, whatever physics beyond the
standard model has in store for us.8
The picture that emerges from these considerations then is that QFTs en-
joy a kind of coarse-grained representational success, capturing some (rela-
tively) long-distance, low-energy, features of the world while distorting its
fundamental structure. A potentially useful comparison here is to continuum
models in ﬂuid mechanics, which misrepresent the atomic structure of real
ﬂuids but accurately describe many of their bulk properties. This ﬁts well
with the effective ﬁeld theory approach to QFT that has come to dominate
high-energy physics in the wake of Wilson’s work on the renormalization
group; at least part of what is meant when physicists characterize the stan-
dard model as an effective ﬁeld theory is that it correctly describes the phys-
ics of currently probed scales but should not be trusted at higher energies.
For the aspiring scientiﬁc realist this differentiated attitude toward the con-
tent of QFT models offers a way of making precise the sense in which these
theories are approximately true along selectivist lines.
4. Some Morals. We have only scratched the surface of how renormaliza-
tion group methods affect our understanding of QFT, and many aspects of
the preceding discussion are controversial. Wallace (2006, 2011) and Wil-
liams (2017) advance similar (and I hope complementary) analyses of the
epistemic signiﬁcance of the renormalization group, but Doreen Fraser (2011)
takes a much more deﬂationary line, which conﬂicts with some of the claims
endorsed above. There remains a great deal of work to be done in developing
and defending the sort of realist view of QFT just outlined then.9 I want to
conclude, however, by returning to the broader question of how scientiﬁc re-
alism ought to be formulated.
8. The idea that renormalization theory should be understood as isolating features of
current theories that are robust under future theory change is advanced in a prescient pa-
per by Alexander Rueger (1990). One concern about the way I have developed this claim
here, pressed by Ruetsche (2018), is that it seems to rest on the assumption that future
theories can be situated in the space of possible theories on which the renormalization
group transformation acts. We can be fairly conﬁdent that future QFTs can be treated
in this way, but when it comes to quantum gravity theories, the question becomes much
murkier. The worry then is that these renormalization group arguments ultimately fall
afoul of Stanford’s ‘unconceived alternatives’ problem for realism.
9. See James Fraser (forthcoming) for a more detailed discussion of this approach to the
epistemology of QFT, which describes avenues for future work.
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What sort of general morals can be extracted from this case study? First
and foremost, it offers further support for a localized response to the formu-
lation problem. The appeal to the renormalization group framework in the
discussion of the previous section exempliﬁes the local selective realist’s
claim that local scientiﬁc resources often play a crucial role in articulating
the relationship a theory bears to the world. Furthermore, we found no need
for an overarching thesis about which parts of our theories get things right.
The resulting analysis of the representational success of QFT models does,
admittedly, chime with the intuitive picture underlying epistemic structural
realism: the fundamental ontological claims of QFT models were rejected
while nonfundamental, broadly structural, features are singled out for realist
optimism. But the putative distinction between structural and nonstructural
features did no real work in identifying appropriate targets for realist com-
mitment and ultimately adds little to the picture furnished by the renormal-
ization group. This all suggests that we ought to abandon as misguided any
attempt to provide a fully general characterization of the approximate truth
of empirically successful theories.
What really makes this case signiﬁcant for the broader formulation de-
bate, however, is that it does not turn on the explicit embedding of a super-
seded theory within a more fundamental successor. This has important im-
plications for the issue of prospective applicability. The worry, remember,
was that, without a general recipe for identifying the belief-worthy content
of a theory, the local realist will be able only to make a highly tentative and
provisional claim about the representational success of our current most fun-
damental theories. Local realists like Saatsi have basically accepted this con-
clusion but reject Stanford’s assertion that giving up on explicit prospective
commitmentsmeans giving up on realism entirely. The renormalization group
case, however, suggests that we do not need a global formulation of realism to
sustain prospective commitments: local theoretical resources can also play a
role in supporting judgments aboutwhich parts of present theorieswill be pre-
served through theory change. The information the renormalization group
provides about the dependencies between the high- and low-energy properties
of QFT models seems to put us in a better epistemic situation with respect to
the standard model than Newton was with respect to his theory of gravity.
This opens up the possibility of a localized response to Stanford’s trust argu-
ment. In some scientiﬁc contexts it may be appropriate to eschew prospective
judgments entirely and adopt the sort ofminimal realist position advocated by
Saatsi; but where scientiﬁc arguments support it, a more full-blooded realist
reading of a theory, which includes commitments about which parts of its con-
tent can be trusted to remain a part of future science, may be possible.
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